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Perpetual Mistrial:  The Impropriety of Transnational Human Rights Litigation in 
United States COURTS 
 
Charles F. Hollis, III1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION:  SEEING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES 
 
I. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala:  Judge Kaufman’s “Benevolent” Odyssey  
 
On 30 June 1980, Judge Irving R. Kaufman authored his decision in Filartiga 
v. Pena-Irala.2  Writing for a unanimous Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New 
York, he held that non-United States (“U.S.”) citizens (“aliens”) may file civil suits in 
U.S. courts for human rights violations committed abroad by other aliens.3  He 
concluded that U.S. federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear such cases based 
upon 28 U.S.C. § 1350, an arcane federal law known as the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”).4  Entitled “Alien’s action for tort”, it states: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
   of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,  
   committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.5 
During the 191-year span between the ATS’s enactment in 1789 and the Filartiga 
decision in 1980, alien plaintiffs only sought jurisdiction under the statute in twenty-
one cases,6 succeeding just twice.7  Before Filartiga, no plaintiff had ever attempted to 
use the statute to obtain jurisdiction in a human rights case.8    
 Although short on verbiage, the ATS has proven itself long on interpretation, 
particularly over the past twenty years.  This is illustrated by the profound 
inconsistency of the U.S. courts' adjudications of transnational human rights 
(“THR”)9 suits filed under the ATS10, and now the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(“TVPA”), which was added to the ATS’s text in 1992.11  The TVPA language 
codifies Filartiga in instances where an “individual who, under actual or apparent 
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authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation” commits torture or an extra-judicial 
killing.12 
At the conclusion of the Filartiga opinion, Judge Kaufman describes his 
holding as “a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free 
all people from brutal violence.”13  With these final words of lofty idealism, Judge 
Kaufman’s benevolent odyssey began; an odyssey to vindicate international human 
rights through transnational litigation, one case at a time.   As established infra, this 
mission, albeit well-intentioned, was ill-considered.            
II. Ending the Myopic Paper Chase 
Since the Filartiga decision, academics, law students and human rights 
advocates have written slews of articles examining the propriety of using the ATS and 
TVPA as means for initiating THR lawsuits in U.S. federal district courts.14  In 
exhaustive fashion, they have analyzed the historical and legal contexts of these 
statutes, arguing both for and against their legal legitimacy as tools for vindicating 
human rights.15  Moreover, they have devoted painstaking research to the issue of 
whether the adjudication of such cases offends separation of powers notions grounded 
in the act of state doctrine,16 the political question doctrine,17 and the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.18  They have also debated the application of forum non 
conveniens.19   
 Regrettably, from a policy standpoint, the analyses provided in these works 
are typically short-sighted, focusing on the means rather than the end.  They 
steadfastly justify or deny the legal legitimacy of THR litigation (the means), rather 
than evaluating its fairness and effectiveness in promoting and enforcing human rights 
(the end).20  Thus, as the common expression goes, they fail to “see the forest for the 
trees.”  These studies devote only superfluous attention (if any at all) to what should 
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be, in my mind's eye, the pivotal concern-- whether the unique structure and 
methodology of civil litigation in the U.S. are conducive to fairly and effectively 
promoting and enforcing international human rights.21  This work devotes long-
deserved attention to this subject.     
III. A New Perspective 
 This work is not only unique in topic, but also in perspective.  A myriad of 
articles have been researched and authored from the perspectives of academics, law 
students and human rights advocates.  However, I have written this article from my 
own perspective, not merely as a scholar of international law, but also as an American 
tort litigation attorney, having experienced firsthand the practical realities of tort 
litigation in the U.S.22   
 This work is divided into two Parts.  Part One analyzes why the structure and 
methodology of the American civil litigation system preclude the fair adjudication of 
THR cases.  Part Two examines why litigating THR cases in U.S. courts is ineffective 
in promoting and enforcing human rights abroad.  Cumulatively, these two Parts 
support the conclusion that it is inappropriate to litigate THR cases in U.S. courts, 
because such litigation fails to fairly or effectively further international human rights 
interests.   
IV. “Fairness” and “Effectiveness” 
 Before addressing the reasons why THR litigation in U.S. courts is unfair and 
ineffective, it is incumbent upon me to explain how I define the terms “fairness” and 
“effectiveness” for purposes of this work.  I submit that “fairness” can simply be 
defined as objectivity, balance and sagacity in the proceedings and adjudication of the 
case at hand.  Moreover, “effectiveness” can be defined as a meaningful and lasting 
solution to the case at hand, as well as to the general human rights dilemma from 
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which the case emerged.  As established infra, the litigation examined in this work 
sorely lacks all of these characteristics.           
PART ONE:  FAIR PLAY OR FARCE? 
I. American Provincialism in THR Cases: A Recipe for Injustice   
 From a global perspective, the American system of civil litigation is 
anomalous.  Its adversarial rules of procedure and precedent-based rules of substance 
are exotic concepts, beyond the ken of most lawyers and judges in other parts of the 
world.  However, these are the rules that U.S. courts generally employ to determine 
the liability of alien defendants in THR cases.  They are not the product of any 
international consensus, and were not created for the specific task of adjudicating 
THR claims.23  They are generally the same, identical rules that govern domestic 
cases.  The framework of adjudication seldom changes, regardless of whether the 
court is addressing alleged acts of genocide in Bosnia or a fender-bender at a stoplight 
in downtown Manhattan. 
 In an article entitled Provincialism in United States Courts, Professor Patrick 
McFadden labels the tendency of U.S. courts “to handle international cases as if they 
were domestic cases” as “methodological provincialism.”24  He observes that: 
  U.S. courts tend to use domestic patterns of analysis in identifying  
the relevant issues in a case and in addressing and defending the  
resolution of those issues.  This type of provincialism . . . flows  
from an approach to rules and their analysis – an approach 
  demonstrably different from that of international courts and  
tribunals.25   
Building upon this argument, I submit that that the structure and methodology of the 
U.S. civil litigation system preclude the fair resolution of THR cases.  Unlike 
Professor McFadden however, whose analysis focuses on U.S. courts’ application of 
substantive law, the following analysis devotes further attention to procedural aspects 
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of American jurisprudence, for it is here that the inequities of the system, vis à vis 
THR cases, are most keenly manifested.     
II. The Issue of Fairness 
 
A. Who Should Decide What is Fair? 
The issue of whether an American court deems its judgment in a THR case as 
fair is largely immaterial.  Every judgment that a U.S. court renders in a THR case 
purports to interpret international human rights norms and apply them 
extraterritorially.  Therefore, the more significant issue is whether the international 
community views the decision as fair.  If it does, then the judgment is more likely to 
influence the community’s promotion and enforcement of human rights norms.  If it 
does not, then the community will view the judgment with skepticism, refusing to 
consider it seriously when developing new human rights policies.  Consequently, the 
issue of fairness is directly related to the issue of effectiveness, which is examined in 
Part Two.  
B. Procedural Integrity as a Determinant of Fairness 
Procedural integrity is a vital factor in determining whether a judgment is fair. 
Common sense dictates that well-balanced proceedings, involving the presentation of 
reliable evidence and the court’s thoughtful evaluation of it, are needed to produce a 
result that others will regard as fair.  When these qualities of procedural integrity are 
lacking, it is only natural that the international community will be less-inclined to 
respect the court’s judgment.     
As demonstrated infra, the manner in which human rights advocates obtain 
exorbitant money judgments against alleged human rights violators embodies self-
contradiction.  These advocates, who are usually so headstrong in safeguarding the 
civil liberties of American criminal defendants accused of reprehensible conduct, are 
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equally zealous in their efforts to punish foreign civil defendants accused of similarly 
abominable behavior.  In the former instance, they critically monitor every step of the 
proceedings, ensuring that the defendant is afforded every protection available under 
the law.  Procedural integrity is revered as gospel.  In the latter instance however, it is 
the very absence of these procedural protections that they exploit in order to obtain 
favorable judgments.  These inequities, manifested at every stage of the proceedings, 
ultimately lead to plaintiff-oriented judgments, arbitrarily fashioned by the judge, jury 
and plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Indeed, inequities exist even before the proceedings begin.        
1. Forum Shopping 
Unlike suits filed against U.S. citizens, suits against aliens may be initiated in 
any federal district court in the U.S.26  This enables the plaintiff’s attorney to search 
for and file suit in the court that is most likely to yield a favorable result, a practice 
commonly referred to as “forum shopping.”  For example, New York has been the 
venue of preference in many THR cases, given the binding precedent of the Filartiga 
case in that jurisdiction.27   
 Plaintiffs’ attorneys suing aliens also enjoy a safety net when forum shopping.  
If a lawsuit against an alien defendant is dismissed in one federal district court, they 
can simply re-file the suit in a different venue.  An example of this notorious practice 
is the recent case of Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.28  In Torres, a group of 
Peruvian citizens sued a Peruvian company in Texas, alleging harm from pollution.29  
The case was dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens and international 
comity.30  However, one of the plaintiffs had re-filed the suit in New York, hoping for 
a better outcome.31  Thus, even before a THR suit commences, the American civil 
litigation framework clearly favors the plaintiff. 
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2. The Complaint 
When plaintiffs’ attorneys draft THR complaints, they normally do so 
assuming that the defendant will fail to appear in court, and that a default judgment 
will be entered, which indeed is usually the case.32  When a judge renders a default 
judgment, she does so with the presumption that all “well-pleaded” claims in the 
plaintiff’s complaint are true.33  This provides a powerful incentive for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to raise many allegations that they would never be able to successfully 
prove in a full-scale trial.34   
 Furthermore, plaintiffs’ attorneys in the U.S. are rarely subjected to penalties 
for filing frivolous lawsuits.  Although Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (“FRCP”) empowers courts to levy sanctions against attorneys who file 
frivolous claims,35 this rule is seldom implemented in practice.  Normally, if a judge 
views a complaint as frivolous, she will warn the plaintiff’s attorney first, 
admonishing him to either withdraw the frivolous claims or else receive sanctions.  
Consequently, plaintiffs’ attorneys have nothing to lose by including spurious 
allegations in their complaints that will, in all likelihood, remain unopposed and 
unaltered until a default judgment is rendered.36  Once this occurs, the defendant is of 
course deemed liable in absentia.     
3. Discovery 
The procedural rules comprising the American civil litigation framework are 
adversarial in nature, espousing the principle of “each for each and the state for 
neither.”37  The just adjudication of a case is equated with the ability of each attorney 
to gather and present every item of evidence that is necessary to vindicate his client’s 
interests.38  This contrasts starkly with the systems of civil law nations, where the 
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judges play a far more active role in the discovery process, garnering evidence and 
even questioning witnesses.39   
 The American rules of civil procedure allow for “broader discovery than 
almost any other nation.”40  Under these rules, attorneys are even permitted to obtain 
evidence that is inadmissible at trial, as long as it appears “reasonably” calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.41  As examined in detail infra however, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys often exploit this rule in THR cases.  Because the defendants 
rarely hire counsel or appear in court, the plaintiffs’ attorneys regularly submit 
evidence at the default judgment hearings and trials in absentia that would never be 
admitted over the objections of defense counsel.   
Furthermore, where exculpatory or mitigating evidence is concerned, the 
American civil litigation system varies dramatically, not only from the American 
criminal system, but also from those of international tribunals.  In the American and 
international criminal systems, the prosecuting attorney is obligated to provide 
defense counsel with any evidence establishing the defendant’s innocence.42  In the 
American civil system however, a plaintiff’s attorney is ethically obligated not to 
provide exculpatory evidence to defense counsel unless the evidence fits the 
description of one of the defendant’s discovery requests, or his client consents.43  If he 
provides opposing counsel with the exculpatory evidence anyway, he could face 
sanctions from the local bar association and perhaps even a malpractice lawsuit from 
his clients.  Therefore, even if a plaintiff’s attorney stumbles upon a piece of evidence 
clearly establishing that the defendant is not liable for a THR violation, he has no 
inherent duty to divulge it to the outside world.  Thus, a plaintiff’s attorney could 
knowingly have a defendant wrongfully declared liable for torture, extrajudicial 
killing, or some other form of gross human rights violation. 
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4. The Judges 
U.S. federal district judges are seldom trained in the field of international 
law.44   Indeed, of these approximately 655 judges,45 very few have any familiarity 
with THR cases.46  Often, their legal educational experiences predate the dramatic 
evolution of this field over the past few decades.47  Moreover, because their case 
dockets are so heavily congested with other matters, these judges do not have ample 
time to thoroughly research these germane, yet arcane issues on their own.48  In spite 
of these shortcomings however, the ATS vests them with two key responsibilities 
demanding at least a modicum of expertise in this highly specialized field.  These 
responsibilities consist of:  (1) determining the content of the “law of nations”, and (2) 
interpreting and applying the law of the state where the alleged conduct occurred (the 
lex locus dilecti).49         
a. Interpreting and applying international law 
U.S. federal district judges are irretrievably enmeshed in American legal 
traditions and culture.  They normally spend their days interpreting and applying laws 
that are based strictly upon American societal values, with little opportunity to widen 
their perspectives beyond these confines.  Therefore, the grave danger of 
provincialism becomes a sudden reality when these same individuals are asked to 
interpret and apply international law.50   
    (1) Provincialism at the international level 
How does such a judge interpret a treaty (to which the U.S. may or may not be 
a member) when she has never done so before, and is totally unacquainted with the 
contents of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, or perhaps even its very 
existence?51  How does she accurately determine the existence of opinio juris, when 
she has little or no background knowledge of the historical, political and cultural 
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contexts underlying the prior behavior of other states towards each other?  How does 
such a judge find the time to thoroughly research the general practices of other states, 
or to make an educated determination of whether a particular state has properly 
manifested dissent from being bound by a custom?   
Given the fact that some scholars have questioned how the International Court 
of Justice itself can reach a proper decision on these matters,52 the endeavor seems 
even more hopeless where judges who are totally unpolished in this esoteric area are 
concerned.  Whereas the ICJ, a court of international composition, can at least impose 
a “guise of objectivity” upon its rulings vis à vis the existence of customary 
international law,53 federal district judges generally do not have this ability and have 
little alternative but to retreat back to provincial, American notions of what is 
customary in the field of human rights.54  This further undermines the integrity of the 
proceedings in the eyes of the international community. 
   (2) Provincialism at the national level 
 The peril of provincialism exists not only at the international level, but also at 
the American level itself.  The existence of 651 different federal district judgeships 
creates the possibility for widely varying interpretations from district to district 
regarding the same issues of international law.  This potential inconsistency threatens 
to undermine the integrity of the proceedings because it encourages forum shopping 
and fails to articulate any uniform standard to which other states may look in 
determining their own views, especially where custom is concerned.                     
   b. Interpreting and applying the lex locus delecti 
THR cases often require American judges to interpret and apply the laws of 
other nations.55  How can this be successfully accomplished when these judges:  (1) 
are only trained in the common law tradition; (2) are generally unaware of the 
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historical, political, socio-cultural and legal contexts from which these laws emerged; 
and (3) have little or no background knowledge regarding the practical application of 
these laws?  The prospect of the American judge failing to “get it right” is yet another 
reason for skepticism regarding the integrity of the proceedings.  Moreover, as 
demonstrated infra, when the application of foreign laws will not satisfy American 
policy interests regarding such matters as punitive damages, the judges will simply 
ignore them and apply U.S. law instead, retreating once again into egoist 
provincialism and thus undermining procedural integrity. 
   c. Judicial impunity 
 Federal district judges are appointed for life.56  Therefore, they are not 
accountable to anyone, inside or outside the U.S., for any decision rendered.  They 
have carte blanche authority to impose their own, individual notions of justice upon 
foreign defendants in transnational cases.  A prime example is the case of Flatlow v. 
Iran, in which the district court judge “expressed his American patriotism by 
awarding--in a default judgment-- $100 million more than was sought by the 
plaintiffs.”57  Furthermore, some allege that the appointments of these judges are the 
products of politics rather than of sheer merit, which creates yet another question of 
how other states might regard the integrity of the decisions rendered.58   
5. Evidentiary Flaws 
Almost every THR case filed in a U.S. federal district court has ended with a 
default  judgment.59  In filing a motion for default judgment, plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
required to submit evidence to the court establishing that their clients are entitled to 
damages.60  Normally, they only need to submit evidence in the form of written 
declarations supporting their claims.61  Sometimes however, the court will go further, 
requiring a hearing with the presentation of testimony, or even a jury trial addressing 
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the issue of damages.62  Either way, where a default has occurred, the evidence that 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys will present in support of their case is likely to have severe 
flaws.  If such evidence was presented at a trial on the merits, in the presence of the 
defendant and his counsel, it would either be inadmissible or impeached as lacking 
credibility.  For example, in the Suarez-Mason cases,63 the plaintiffs’ counsel readily 
acknowledged that had they proceeded to trial, “they would have lost on the merits for 
lack of evidence linking Suarez-Mason to the human rights violations.”64 
a. Hearsay 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay evidence is defined as an out of 
court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.65  Both oral 
testimony and documentary evidence may constitute hearsay.66  With a few 
exceptions, items constituting hearsay evidence are inadmissible at trial because they 
lack sufficient credibility to prove the existence of a fact.67  This lack of credibility is 
premised upon flaws in the declarant’s sincerity, narration, perception and memory.68   
 Nevertheless, in THR cases, such unreliable evidence often forms a pivotal 
part of the plaintiff’s case.  Two excellent examples are the Gramajo cases69, 
command responsibility cases in which the plaintiffs, in their efforts to establish a link 
between the former Guatemalan defense minister and alleged acts of “summary 
execution, torture, disappearance, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” and 
arbitrary detention,70 “were forced to rely on newspaper articles and third-hand 
evidence, which posed problems of hearsay, double hearsay, and even triple 
hearsay.”71   
Another controversial case, which actually ended in a trial on the merits, is In 
re Estate of Marcos.72  Here, the judge allowed the admission into evidence of “all 
statements attributed to any member of the Philippine armed forces or security 
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units.”73  He did so by contending that these statements constituted the admissions of 
party-opponents and declarations against interest, which constitute exceptions to the 
hearsay rule.74                   
Several of the THR suits filed in federal district courts, including Filartiga, 
have been filed by attorneys affiliated with the Center for Constitutional Rights 
(“CCR”) in New York City.75  In 1996, Beth Stephens, a former CCR attorney, and 
Mark Ratner, a current CCR attorney, published International Human Rights 
Litigation in U.S. Courts.76  This book provides aspiring plaintiffs’ attorneys with 
step-by-step instructions on how to litigate THR cases in federal district courts.77   
In their book, Stephens and Ratner encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys in THR 
cases to present hearsay evidence to the court when seeking a default judgment.  They 
do this by encouraging these attorneys to submit “any documents or declarations 
which support the claim.  These could include medical bills and doctors’ reports; 
therapists’ evaluations; declarations from lay people concerning the harm suffered by 
the plaintiff; and economist’s evaluations of lost lifetime earnings.”78  Absent a 
stipulation by defense counsel as to the authenticity and admissibility of the 
aforementioned items, or testimony from the authors of these documents as to their 
authenticity and veracity, these items would be inadmissible at a trial where defense 
counsel is present to raise objections.79  It is true that the plaintiffs might be able to 
present all of the witnesses necessary to authenticate these documents.  However, as 
Stephens and Ratner themselves have established, they generally will not have to, as 
decisions are usually based solely upon the written evidence presented.80  
b. Witness credibility 
(1) Bias 
The defendant and defense counsel are almost never present at the evidentiary 
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proceedings.  Therefore, they rarely have occasion, through cross-examination and the 
presentation of their own evidence, to expose any bias tainting the plaintiffs’ 
testimonial evidence.  This gives plaintiffs’ attorneys the opportunity to present, 
without reproach, heavily biased evidence devoid of credibility. 
(a) Quid pro quo 
Within the American system of civil litigation, attorneys regularly have  
continuous working relationships with expert witnesses in different fields.81  In the 
THR context, this is illustrated by referring once again to the work of Stephens and 
Ratner.  Appendix L of their book contains a list of five different providers of 
“Medical and Psychological Services for Victims of Torture.”82  Bearing in mind that 
their book targets a reading audience of attorneys rather than of torture victims, this 
Appendix is tantamount to a list of suggested expert witnesses. 
 A quid pro quo relationship frequently exists between attorneys and their 
expert witnesses.  In exchange for the expert’s favorable report or testimony, the 
attorney retains her services for other cases and recommends her to other attorneys.  
In the end, both sides benefit, and the expert has an economic incentive to testify 
favorably in future proceedings.  At a normal trial, where both parties are present with 
counsel, the biases of each side’s experts generally cancel each other out during the 
respective cross-examinations.  However, this is not the situation in a garden-variety 
THR case.  The experts are not subject to cross-examination, and can therefore 
embellish or exaggerate their testimony without fear of impeachment.   
(2) Eyewitness credibility 
There is a genuine risk that an eyewitness giving testimony at a THR 
proceeding will wrongfully identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the purported 
violation or violations.  This is particularly so when the defendant is a low-level 
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official whom the plaintiffs did not know by name when the alleged acts were 
committed, as opposed to the likes of the highly-publicized Ferdinand Marcos or 
Radovan Karadzic.  Moreover, it has been scientifically established that the 
possibility for an incorrect identification increases when the defendant is not 
physically present before the witness, as is usually the case in these types of 
proceedings.83   
There is also the time element.  If decades have passed since the plaintiff last 
saw the defendant, there may be more uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff indeed 
recognizes him, based upon his appearance so many years later.84  The time factor is 
particularly significant for cases brought under the ATS, which has no statute of 
limitations.85     
c. A game of half-truths 
Professor Jose E. Alvarez contends that “civil suits may be more effective than 
criminal prosecutions in establishing the full factual context in which the perpetrators 
committed their crimes.”86  It is my assertion that in practice, the very opposite holds 
true.  An assumption exists within the American system of civil litigation that the 
adversarial method of producing evidence during the proceedings is conducive to 
eliciting the “whole truth.”  Using this method, each attorney presents his best case, 
submitting all of the relevant evidence that is favorable to his side and unfavorable to 
the opposing side.  Ideally, this results in the court’s cognizance of the “whole truth”- 
the respective strengths and weaknesses of both cases. 
 The problem with this system however, is that it only requires an attorney to 
divulge half of the truth.  A hypothetical example best illustrates my point.  Let’s 
suppose that A sues B, claiming that B assaulted her, permanently injuring her back.  
A’s attorney knows that certain medical records exist establishing that his client had 
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chronic back problems even before the assault occurred.  However, for one reason or 
another, B’s attorney fails to take the necessary steps to obtain this information.  At 
trial, A’s attorney is not required to disclose the existence of these records.  Moreover, 
he is not required to ask his client any questions regarding her ailments prior to the 
alleged assault.  As long as no one overtly lies about anything, his case remains 
entirely legitimate under the adversarial system.  His only obligation is to present his 
“best case” and let the court decide whether it is believable.  In other words, he only 
needs to present half of the truth.  It is B’s attorney’s job to competently present the 
other half.   
 This “game of half-truths” poses severe problems in the arena of THR 
litigation, particularly when the plaintiff’s attorney is unopposed.  He is free to tell 
just “one side of the story”, and has no obligation to divulge any evidence that is 
unfavorable to his case.  As long as no one overtly lies about anything, this practice is 
wholly permissible under the American system.   
 Viewed aggregately, the default-nature of most THR cases vests the plaintiffs 
with enormous evidentiary advantages that they would not enjoy in a conventional 
trial setting where both sides are present.  However, the evidentiary advantages do not 
end here.  Their potential impact on the ultimate judgment is further amplified by an 
unusually light burden of proof, as discussed infra.    
6. The Trial 
As established supra, most THR cases never make it to trial.  Moreover, even 
if a case does reach this stage, it is normally a trial in absentia.  Nevertheless, a 
thorough analysis of the procedural integrity issue requires an examination of 
scenarios where the defendant does appear at trial.  As demonstrated, even if the 
defendant does appear, he will still face a plethora of disadvantages. 
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a. Finding a lawyer 
           Plaintiffs initiating THR lawsuits in U.S. courts typically do not pay any 
attorneys’ fees.87  Indeed, as established infra, human rights advocacy groups such as 
the CCR have non-pecuniary incentives for representing plaintiffs in THR suits.  
Highly skilled and experienced in the litigation of these claims, these attorneys 
provide their clients with outstanding representation.88  
 The defendants in THR cases are not so fortunate.  Few attorneys will 
volunteer to defend an individual accused of gross THR violations.  Moreover, 
because the defendants in these cases are typically low-level civil servants, most will 
not be able to afford a high-caliber defense attorney whose skill matches that of the 
plaintiff’s attorneys.  Furthermore, even if the defendant does have such resources, the 
impact of his attorney’s skill will likely be marginalized by the highly specialized and 
esoteric nature of the claims raised.  No American attorney defends THR cases for a 
living. 
If a defendant cannot afford counsel, there is a distinct possibility that he will 
have to represent himself pro se at trial.  Unlike in criminal cases, where impecunious 
defendants are constitutionally entitled to defense counsel,89 no such guarantee is 
afforded to civil defendants.  For example, in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, a THR case 
alleging human rights violations in Ethiopia,90 the “court rejected the defendant’s 
request for court-appointed counsel, and the defendant represented himself at trial.”91  
Naturally, such a situation provides the plaintiff with a profound advantage at trial. 
b. The costs 
Defending against a THR lawsuit is costly.  Normally, civil defense attorneys 
bill their clients an hourly fee for their services.  They also require reimbursement 
from their clients for all expenses incurred during the course of the litigation.  This 
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means that the defendant in a THR case has the burden of “matching resources” with 
the plaintiff’s attorneys, likely incurring enormous expenses.   
 The attorney alone will be very expensive, based upon the law of supply and 
demand.  Very few lawyers have any expertise in THR litigation.  Therefore, those 
who have such skills are in a position to charge more when defending such cases.  Of 
course, the defendant can always opt for an attorney with lesser skills, but then he 
runs the risk of being out-maneuvered by the highly-polished attorneys representing 
the plaintiffs.   
Attorney’s fees are only the beginning.  Depending on how well the defendant 
and his attorney are able to communicate, they may have to hire a translator, who will 
spend many hours with them as they prepare their case.  Translators may also be 
needed to translate documents obtained during the course of discovery.92    
 Discovery expenses are also likely to be exorbitant.  The defendant will need 
to obtain evidence and interview witnesses supporting the defense,93 which might also 
require the hiring of a private investigator and possibly local counsel.  Should he need 
for these witnesses to testify at trial, he will have to pay for their transportation.94  It is 
also likely that the defendant will need to hire his own expert witnesses to refute the 
expert testimonies presented by the plaintiff.   
 It will easily cost a defendant tens of thousands of dollars to defend against a 
garden-variety THR case.  Therefore, it is no surprise that very few non-corporate 
defendants can afford to properly defend such a case all the way through a trial on the 
merits.  Most simply do not have the resources of the Ferdinand Marcos estate.95  
Their inability to match resources with the plaintiffs places them at a distinct 
disadvantage throughout the course of the litigation. 
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c. Juries 
The concept of the jury is a unique and cherished notion of American 
jurisprudence.  Juries are pools of randomly-selected citizens,96 presumed to represent 
a cross-section of the venue’s community- the “peers” of the defendant.  The jury 
system is founded upon the presumption that a jury can fairly and impartially 
determine: (1) the weight and credibility of the evidence presented; (2) a criminal 
defendant’s guilt or innocence (and sometimes his punishment as well); (3) a civil 
defendant’s liability or lack thereof; and (4) the damages that a civil defendant should 
pay.   
As a civil trial attorney, practicing primarily in the realm of personal injury 
defense, it was my experience that jurors generally do an excellent job in fulfilling 
their “civil duties,” as we call them in the U.S.  My post-trial conversations with 
jurors revealed them to be insightful, attentive, and even intuitive at times.  As a 
personal matter, I think that the civil jury system is generally fair and effective- for 
adjudicating local disputes.  Where THR matters are concerned however, my 
conclusion is very different. 
(1) Nobody’s peers 
When a THR case is tried before a jury, the parties will have little in common 
with the jurors.  They will come from different nations, cultures, societies and 
economic backgrounds.  They will likely speak different languages.  The 
commonality of backgrounds that jurors typically share with the parties, which is the 
very cornerstone of the American jury system, is notably absent in THR cases.  
Nevertheless, even in these cases plaintiffs attorneys such as Stephens and Ratner 
favor jury trials over bench trials.97 
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A particularly eloquent critique against the practice of using American juries 
to try THR cases is that of Professor Maxwell Chibundu.  In his article, entitled 
Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication:  A Structural 
Inquiry,98 Professor Chibundu criticizes the provincialism of this practice.  He 
observes that although the jury system is founded upon the notion of representative 
democracy: 
  [It] is precisely these ‘strengths’ of the American jury that 
  renders it an unsuitable instrument for promoting international 
  human rights claims; for it can do so only at some cost to the 
  intellectual coherence of its idealized justification. . . . [A] jury 
  with no foreigners on it lacks the legitimacy to preside over  
  claims arising outside the state and which involves parties 
  none of whom are members of the political community.  Even 
  if, as some argue, international human rights represent values  
  that are ‘universal’, the interpretation of those values in the  
  particular case by complete strangers to the environment in which 
  the alleged events took place, and who lack any practical interest 
  in the future structure of that environment surely denude their  
  decision of the indicia of democratic legitimation . . .99    
   
In discussing the jury’s deliberation process, Chibundu states that: 
 
  [T]he jurors who will be deliberating about facts that at best they 
  can only dimly perceive, and which, for the most part, neither 
  their daily existence nor their readings provide them with  
  meaningful reference points.100 
 
 In summary, American juries are not suitable for fairly adjudicating THR 
cases.  Their remoteness from the parties and events in controversy detracts from the 
integrity of the proceedings and the results generated from them.  Therefore, the rest 
of the world is not likely to respect the American jury as an educated and objective 
arbiter of international human rights standards.  
  7. Damages 
 If the court (by which I mean the judge or jury) concludes that the defendant is 
liable to the plaintiff, then damages must be determined.  In the THR context, the 
plaintiffs typically seek two different categories of damages, compensatory and 
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punitive.  The theory behind compensatory damages is basic and inconspicuous.101  
The concept of punitive damages however, is a largely American phenomenon.102   
As discussed supra, the default setting, so common in THR cases, confers 
plaintiffs’ attorneys with a profound advantage when presenting evidence of damages.  
They can present hearsay evidence that is normally inadmissible, and biased evidence 
that is normally impeachable.  Moreover, by playing the “game of half-truths,” they 
can avoid submitting any evidence serving to mitigate the plaintiffs’ damages.  
However, there are other reasons why it is inequitable for American courts to 
determine damages in THR cases. 
a. Punitive damages:  Justice “American-style” 
 There is a lack of international precedent for imposing punitive damages as a 
response to violations of international norms.103  However, this has not dissuaded U.S. 
courts from awarding punitive damages in THR cases.104  In the American system, 
punitive damages are designed to accomplish two objectives - punishment and 
deterrence.105  They punish egregious conduct,106 and deter similar future behavior by 
making an example of the defendant.107   
 Therefore, in the THR context, American courts are delegated the 
responsibility for issuing verdicts designed to punish non-citizens for extraterritorial 
conduct committed against other non-citizens, and to make examples of them for 
others who might consider perpetrating similar acts abroad in the future.  However, 
these decision-makers are profoundly secluded from the daily realities of the societies, 
cultures and economic situations of those whom they seek to influence and assist 
through their verdicts.  Moreover, as established supra, their decisions are normally 
founded solely upon the plaintiff’s uncontested case.  Thus, the integrity of decisions 
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to award punitive damages, implementing a concept of justice virtually unknown to 
the rest of the world, is suspect.   
b. Inconsistency in the choice of law 
No set formula exists to guide American judges’ decisions as to which 
nation’s law should govern the determination of damages.  This matter is relegated to 
the whims of the individual judges.  The Filartiga decision provides a handy example.  
Here, the trial court held that Paraguayan law should govern the determination of 
compensatory damages, as Paraguay had the closest connection to the violation.108  
However, when considering the issue of punitive damages, the court deliberately 
ignored Paraguayan law because it did not allow for such.109  The court concluded 
that: “the objective of the international law making torture punishable as a crime can 
only be vindicated by imposing punitive damages,” applying U.S. law instead.110  
This chauvinistic philosophy of only applying the lex locus dilecti where it 
complements American notions of justice begs the oft-repeated question of whether 
such judgments will inspire other states when making policy decisions regarding 
human rights issues.  This concern is magnified by the general unenforceability of 
punitive damage award, which is addressed in Part Two. 
 C. The Determination of Accountability  
In addressing the issue of whether U.S. courts can fairly adjudicate THR 
cases, we must also question the process used in determining the defendant’s 
accountability for human rights violations.  This process varies distinctly from others 
serving this function, particularly those of the international criminal tribunals.  
Compared with those systems, the American civil framework sets a far lower 
threshold for labeling someone as a hostis humani generis, or enemy of all 
mankind.111          
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1. The Burden of Proof 
In a THR case tried before a U.S. court, the plaintiff only needs to establish 
the defendant’s liability by a “preponderance of the evidence.”112  This means that the 
plaintiff only needs to prove that it is more than fifty percent likely that the defendant 
committed the alleged human rights violation.113  This is a far cry from the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard that other tribunals use to determine accountability for 
such violations.114   
 Bearing all of this in mind, we return again to the issue of fairness.  It is unfair 
for a defendant to be branded as an “enemy of all mankind” when the court concludes 
that this is “more likely than not” based upon evidence involving hearsay, bias, 
questionable identifications of the missing defendant, or half-truths.  Furthermore, it is 
highly unlikely that other states and their citizens will hold such conclusions in high 
regard, and improbable that such results will influence them when addressing 
contemporary human rights issues within their borders. 
2. The Time Factor 
Unlike criminal defendants, civil defendants in U.S. courts do not have the 
luxury of a speedy trial.  Once a complaint is filed, it normally takes years for a case 
to go to trial in a U.S. federal district court.115  The Marcos case was the “first full-
scale civil trial of human rights claims” in the U.S.116  After the filing of the initial 
complaint, the case did not go to trial for another six years.117   
Such long delays are more likely in THR cases because of discovery 
complications.  Because most of the evidence is located outside the U.S., attorneys for 
both parties face a host of complications in garnering all of the materials necessary for 
presenting their cases.  Some of these complications may relate to other states’ laws 
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governing the discovery of evidence.118  Other complications may involve contacting 
witnesses, locating physical evidence, or translating documents.119 
Again, the issue of fairness re-emerges.  Is it fair that the civil process for 
adjudicating someone as an “enemy of all mankind” should take so long when 
defendants in U.S. criminal courts and international criminal tribunals are guaranteed 
speedy trials as a matter of right?120  Furthermore, what if the defendant is an active 
world leader, such as Robert Mugabe, who was served with a summons and complaint 
while visiting the U.S.?121  It is true that suits against world leaders are likely to be 
dismissed on such bases as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.122  However, 
months or even years of procedural maneuvering may be required to obtain this result.     
There is also the question of whether such a process is fair to the leader’s 
constituents.  In order to present a respectable defense, the defendant and his lawyer 
must spend many hours together in preparation.  Is it fair that a world leader should be 
forced to squander valuable time preparing his defense against a civil suit rather than 
pursuing what he views as the interests of his constituents?123  Where the leader is an 
elected official, it can be argued that his removal from the performance of official 
duties in order to defend against a civil lawsuit, detracts from his constituents’ right of 
self-determination.  By filing such a lawsuit, the plaintiffs’ attorneys seek to vindicate 
one category of human rights at the expense of others- namely political rights, which 
are arguably the most fundamental of all.124  
  Moreover, the U.S. State Department has voiced serious concern about the 
prospect of “nuisance suits.”  “Nuisance suits” are lawsuits initiated for the purpose of 
targeting and harassing political adversaries.  David P. Stewart, an Assistant Legal 
Adviser at the U.S. State Department has commented that: 
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  From a foreign policy perspective, we are particularly concerned 
  over the prospect of nuisance or harassment suits brought by  
  political opponents or for publicity purposes, where allegations  
  may be made against foreign governments or officials who are 
  not torturers but who will be required to defend against  
 expensive and drawn-out legal proceedings.125 
In order to fully appreciate the reasons why plaintiffs’ attorneys might be inclined to 
file nuisance suits in THR cases, we must examine the political motives behind THR 
litigation in the U.S., the next issue addressing fairness. 
D. Political Witchhunts 
 In the “Acknowledgments” section of the book that he co-authored with Beth 
Stephens, Mark Ratner states that the CCR has been his “political home for 25 
years.”126  The question instantly emerging from this comment is whether the CCR, 
which has initiated so many THR suits in U.S. courts over the past 22 years, seeks to 
vindicate human rights in general, or only those fitting their political agenda.  Strong 
evidence supports the latter contention.  Jean-Marie Simon observes: 
  Since the [ATS] was first used in human rights causes in 1980, 
attorneys have selectively invoked it to punish either individual 
right-wing officials or their governments.  It is not exactly 
news, of course, that right-wing governments commit well-
documented human rights violations.  They are not, however, 
alone; during the [time] since Filártiga was decided, those 
plaintiffs’ attorneys most given to filing claims under the 
[ATS]-- principally the New York-based [CCR]-- have never 
used the [ATS] to press claims against leftist governments or 
“progressive” targets. The choice of defendants emanates as 
much from a desire to punish ideological opponents as from a 
desire to obtain legal redress.127 
 
Although Simon’s article was written approximately ten years ago, these observations 
are just as true today.  In my research, I was unable to locate a single THR case that 
the CCR has instituted against a leftist regime since that time.128   
 It thus becomes clear that at least some plaintiffs’ attorneys initiating THR 
cases in U.S. courts do so desiring to fulfill a political agenda, rather than to 
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objectively vindicate international human rights.  Here, we see unfairness on all sides.  
Defendants are arbitrarily selected based upon their political ideologies.  Perhaps even 
more unjust, however, are these attorneys’ uses of their clients’ testimonies as means 
to political ends.  It begs the question of whether their ultimate goal is justice for their 
clients or the fulfillment of a political objective.  It is also unfair to the victims of 
human rights abuses by leftist regimes, who may be left without a voice if their stories 
do not suit the attorneys’ agendas.    
1. Who’s Minding the Lawsuit? 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys supporting THR litigation in U.S. courts argue that 
“[c]ivil suits provide a mechanism by which individual victims can initiate and 
control the legal process.”129  This argument is largely illusory.  Remember that the 
plaintiffs represented in these cases are aliens.  In all likelihood, they have little 
knowledge or understanding of how the American system of civil litigation functions.  
Moreover, it is the attorney who decides whether to represent the plaintiff and file the 
lawsuit.  Once the lawsuit is filed, the attorney recommends the courses of action that 
are taken throughout the duration of the litigation.  Although the rules of ethics 
require the attorney to follow his client’s wishes,130 these wishes are almost always 
based upon the attorney’s advice.  Therefore, although the client may be in control in 
theory, the attorney remains in control in practice.  
E. Corporate Defendants 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have also filed THR lawsuits in U.S. courts against 
foreign corporations.131  Although such defendants might have sufficient assets to 
afford capable defense counsel throughout the course of litigation, they still remain at 
a severe disadvantage due to certain factors already examined, such as forum 
shopping, uninformed judges and juries, and a low burden of proof.   
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Additionally, corporate defendants face other disadvantages that are not as 
likely to affect THR defendants who are natural persons, such as civil servants or 
world leaders.  Because plaintiffs’ attorneys are more likely to represent their clients 
on a contingency fee basis in corporate cases, they are thus more likely to have a 
personal stake in the outcome.132  This provides them with a greater incentive to sue 
corporations, forcing them to choose between agreeing to quick settlements (from 
which they would receive a hefty percentage) and facing critical media attention that 
is likely to deter investors.  Indeed, because civil suits are a matter of public record in 
the U.S., there is a distinct possibility that the public will learn about such cases 
anyway.  It is also worth noting that many foreign corporate defendants are horrified 
by the concept of punitive damages, which can serve as another source of pressure to 
settle quickly.133   
The phenomenon of suing foreign corporations in THR cases is relatively new.  
Where it will lead remains to be seen.  What is certain however, is that the structure 
and methodology of the American system of civil litigation places all defendants at a 
disadvantage in THR cases, regardless of whether they are natural persons or  
corporations.  
III. Conclusions 
A. Mission Impossible 
Rigid, provincialist adherence to the traditional structure and methodology of 
civil litigation in the U.S. makes the fair adjudication of THR cases impossible.  Even 
before such a lawsuit is filed, inequities exist- namely the ability of the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to file suit in the most favorable district, or on repeated occasions.  It is 
often politics, rather than a desire to objectively vindicate human rights, that 
motivates the suit’s filing.  After the lawsuit is filed, the defendant is subjected to a 
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virtual avalanche of disadvantages, which are greatly amplified by the likelihood of a 
default judgment.  Adding to the proceedings’ lack of integrity is the courts’ 
remoteness from the contexts in which the alleged THR violations occurred. 
 Accountability is normally determined based solely upon the plaintiff’s “side 
of the story.”  Consequently, the defendant is labeled, in absentia, as an “enemy of all 
mankind.”  This conclusion is reached in a manner abjectly lacking the procedural 
safeguards of American and international criminal courts. 
Moreover, it is in this setting that punitive damages, a concept generally 
unknown to international tribunals, are imposed against the defendant.  The prospect 
of receiving a percentage of such punitive damages, particularly in lawsuits now 
being instituted against corporate THR defendants, can serve as a powerful incentive 
for plaintiffs’ attorneys to sue and exert pressure for quick and lucrative settlements.  
Moreover, the unique circumstances of THR cases make it easier for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to influence their clients’ decisions on how to proceed. 
 I submit that all of these factors, in combination, make it impossible for a U.S.  
court to fairly adjudicate a civil THR case.  The objectivity, balance and sagacity 
required for fairness are all conspicuously absent.  Of course, those supporting such 
litigation are likely to retort that the defendants “bring the inequities upon 
themselves” by failing to appear in court.  However, this argument ignores the fact 
that most defendants will lack the ability to retain counsel.  Moreover, even with 
representation they will still face the stark disadvantages of forum shopping, 
uninformed judges and juries, and a low burden of proof.  Given the inevitability of 
unfairness in these cases, those who so staunchly support this litigation should take 
pause for a moment and honestly ask themselves whether they would go to the trouble 
of appearing in a U.S. court if they were the defendants in these cases.   
  29
B. For the Advancement of Human Rights 
It would be nice if, as some have suggested, American courts could fairly 
adjudicate THR cases just as they would contract disputes.134  Unfortunately, such is a 
matter of fancy rather than of fact.  The arguments that I have presented supra, 
illustrating the impossibility of this endeavor, are made for the sake of advancing the 
promotion and enforcement of international human rights, not as a defense for the 
conduct of monsters.  Regardless of how deplorably these defendants may have 
behaved, they must be brought to justice fairly, not just for their sakes, but more 
importantly, for the sake of international human rights.   
The sovereign states forming the international community will not take the 
decisions of another nation’s “kangaroo courts” seriously when formulating and 
implementing domestic policies addressing human rights issues.  Consequently, the 
inherent lack of fairness in the U.S. system of litigating THR cases results in a failure 
to effectively further the interests of human rights abroad.  However, this lack of 
fairness is not the only reason why such litigation is ineffective.  Many other reasons 
exist, which are examined in the next Part.        
PART TWO:  TRIVIAL PURSUITS 
 
I. What’s in a Number? 
 
 In 1984, Judge Eugene Nickerson of the Federal District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York awarded Dr. Joel and Dolly Filartiga a total of $10,385,364 in 
damages for the brutal torturing and killing of seventeen year-old Joelito.135  Nothing 
happened.  No Paraguayan court enforced the judgment, no measures were taken to 
ameliorate the human rights situation in Paraguay, and most Paraguayans never even 
learned about the case. 136   These are the observations of the Filartigas themselves, 
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who remarked that any satisfaction they received from the verdict has been 
“overshadowed by the complete lack of response in Paraguay.”137               
 Such a result is the rule, not the exception.  Since Filartiga, dozens of THR 
suits have been filed in U.S. courts,138 some leading to judgments for millions of 
dollars.139  However, during the two decades that U.S. courts have been rendering 
such judgments, no judgment has ever been paid, with the exception of $400 collected 
from Argentine General Suarez-Mason.140  More significantly, these judgments have 
had virtually no impact on human rights interests abroad.141       
 This Part explains why THR litigation in U.S. courts, in addition to being 
hopelessly unfair, is also hopelessly ineffective.  As established infra, other than 
providing the plaintiffs in these cases with the instant gratification of favorable 
judgments, nothing lasting has ever been accomplished through such litigation.  Its 
legacy has been and will continue to be an ever-growing list of failures, underscoring 
its total inability to effectively promote and enforce human rights abroad.  It is to this 
list that we now turn our attention.          
II. A Legacy of Failures 
 
A. Failure to Compensate the Victims 
 
1. Easy Flight for Defendants 
As just discussed, with the exception of the paltry $400 collected from 
General Suarez-Mason, no plaintiff has ever collected a judgment against a defendant 
in a THR case tried in a U.S. civil court.  Unlike criminal cases, in which the 
defendant is often held in custody, civil defendants are free to flee at their own 
volition.  Therefore, in THR cases, the defendants typically flee the U.S. with their 
assets before the court’s decision is announced.142  Moreover, in situations where 
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these defendants are ex-dictators or their associates, they will likely enjoy the ability 
to hide their assets in various forms and places.143 
  2. An Expensive Collection Process  
 The matter is further complicated by the fact that the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
generally lack expertise in the field of enforcing and collecting the judgments of U.S.  
courts abroad.144  It is expensive for the plaintiffs to pursue collection abroad because 
it “involves protracted technical and jurisdictional issues.”145  Moreover, “substantial 
advance cash outlays” are often needed.146  Because the plaintiffs’ attorneys in THR 
cases are normally “public interest” groups, such as the CCR, they must rely upon 
financial, intellectual and labor donations for the funding of their lawsuits.147  
Although these resources are plentiful during the earlier stages of the proceedings, 
they generally are not once the litigation reaches the collection phase.148 
3. A Paucity of Enforcement Conventions 
The U.S. is not a party to any bilateral or multilateral treaty providing for the 
enforcement of its courts’ money judgments in other countries.149  It is true that the 
U.S. is likely to join the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters.150  However, it remains uncertain whether the 
Convention will permit courts to enforce foreign judgments providing relief to THR 
plaintiffs in situations where the defendant also stands trial in criminal court for the 
same offenses.151  Moreover, even if the Convention ultimately does allow this, it 
remains questionable whether states harboring the assets of THR violators will ever 
join the Convention anyway. 
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4. Foreign Judicial Concerns Regarding Enforcement 
 
a. Public policy  
For public policy reasons, foreign courts sometimes refuse to enforce 
American judgments.152  This scenario is particularly common in situations where the 
U.S. court awards punitive damages.153  For example, Germany considers punitive 
and exemplary damages as fundamentally contrary to its public policy.154  As a result, 
its courts have refused to enforce the punitive damages portions of U.S. judgments.155  
Because punitive damages are so prevalent in THR cases, there is reason for 
skepticism regarding the likelihood that such judgments will be enforced in foreign 
courts. 
b. Jurisdiction 
Foreign courts may scrutinize the manner in which U.S. courts obtain 
jurisdiction over defendants in THR cases.156  U.S. courts have frequently asserted 
personal jurisdiction over THR defendants based upon the plaintiffs’ use of “tag 
service of process,” which involves physically handing the summons and complaint to 
the defendant while in the location where jurisdiction is sought.157  However, some 
key European states, such as Germany, do not recognize tag service as a legitimate 
means of obtaining jurisdiction.158  As a result, jurisdictional issues may preclude the 
plaintiffs from enforcing their judgments in foreign courts. 
c. Choice of law 
 A foreign court may also refuse to enforce a U.S. judgment if it concludes that 
the American judge failed to properly decide choice of law issues.159  For example, 
the courts of the Philippines, France and Poland all reserve the right to review such 
decisions.160  Reflecting back upon the U.S. courts’ inconsistent applications of the 
lex locus delecti when determining damages in cases such as Filartiga, it becomes 
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clear that choice of law issues may return to haunt plaintiffs’ attorneys in THR cases 
when they seek to enforce their judgments abroad.             
d. Default judgments 
Foreign courts may also be skeptical of the default judgments so commonly 
rendered in THR cases before U.S. courts.161  Regarding this matter, Part One 
explains it thoroughly.  The proceedings are so inherently unfair to the defendants that 
a foreign court would have good reason for expressing reluctance to enforce such a 
judgment. 
5. Impecunious Defendants 
Even if plaintiffs are able to clear all of the aforementioned hurdles to 
collection, their efforts are still likely to be much ado about nothing.  Because heads 
of state and high-level officials are typically shielded from liability in U.S. courts by 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the Act of State Doctrine or the 
Political Question Doctrine, it is normally the case against the low-level official that 
reaches a final judgment.  Such defendants are seldom capable of paying even a tiny 
fraction of the exorbitant judgments awarded in THR cases.  An example is the case 
of Abebe-Jira v. Negewo.162  Here, the defendant was accused of torturing the 
plaintiffs while working as a jailer in Ethiopia during the Dergue dictatorship of the 
mid-1970s.163  When one of the plaintiffs located him in Atlanta, Georgia, he was 
working at a hotel.164  The plaintiffs have yet to recover any of the $1.5 million 
judgment rendered against him.165 
 In summary, no plaintiff has ever collected any substantial damages stemming 
from a U.S. court’s judgment in a THR case.  Moreover, no one is ever likely to do 
so.  Essentially, this means that THR litigation in U.S. courts fails to achieve its own 
basic objective, which is to remunerate individual plaintiffs for damages they 
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sustained when their human rights were violated.  However, it also fails to achieve the 
policy objectives of those who advocate its use most zealously.  These failures are the 
next subjects of discussion.  
B. Failure to Deny a Safe Haven 
During the course of oral arguments before the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Filartiga, one of the judges asked: “Because the defendant apparently does 
not have much money, what was the point of this high-profile case, other than getting 
your name in the newspapers?”166  Peter Weiss, an attorney with the CCR, responded:  
The point was to send a message that the United States is  
not a haven for people like Pena-Irala.  People who torture  
are not welcome here, and if they come here, they will be  
pursued by their victims, who will use the full arsenal of the  
U.S. judicial process to defend and vindicate their rights.167     
 
Since Filartiga, Weiss’ argument has remained popular among those supporting THR 
litigation in U.S. courts.168  Indeed, the policy of denying a safe haven to torturers was 
part of what motivated Congress to enact the TVPA.169   
 Without question, this policy is a sound one, and I submit that the U.S. 
government should continually seek its effective fulfillment.  However, Weiss’ 
argument is incorrect in implying that THR litigation is an effective way to achieve 
this end.  This is because the volume of lawsuits filed is too small to communicate an 
effective message to torturers hiding in the U.S.  Indeed, the long odds against THR 
plaintiffs recovering judgments have an undeniable chilling effect on the number of 
lawsuits filed.170  Moreover, as established supra, even Weiss’ own organization, the 
CCR, is only willing to file suit against select groups of torturers, excluding other 
potential defendants.  This is only natural given the political agendas of the non-profit 
advocacy groups normally representing the plaintiffs in THR litigation.   
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 The policy of denying a safe haven to torturers in the U.S. is not a valid 
justification for THR litigation in U.S. courts.  If the U.S. truly seeks to competently 
fulfill this policy objective, then it should resort to other, more effective means.  
Otherwise, it will remain all too easy for torturers to hide in the U.S., a nation of 285 
290 million people171 spanning over 9 eleven million square kilometers.172  
C. Failure to Deter Future THR Violations 
Supporters of THR litigation in U.S. courts argue that such litigation serves to 
deter future THR violations.173  However, other human rights advocates readily 
acknowledge that “[i]t is unlikely that civil litigation in U.S. courts will, in the long 
run, represent an effective means of deterring or punishing massive human rights 
abuses.”174  The question of deterrence can be phrased in the following way:  Does the 
prospect of being sued in a U.S. court have any influence on the decisions of high-
level or low-level officials when they consider implementing or executing policies 
that violate human rights?  The answer to this question is clearly “no” for a number of 
reasons.  Some of the most compelling reasons, such as the plaintiff’s inability to 
collect a judgment and the infrequency of lawsuits, have already been addressed 
supra, and require no further examination.  There are two other compelling reasons 
however, that do warrant analysis.        
1. The Momentum of Hatred 
Few would disagree that human rights violations are typically products of 
hatred and violence.  Such conduct is generally motivated by powerful ideological 
influences, whether political, religious or otherwise, that advocate a “spiral of 
violence”.175  When such a climate descends upon a society, “[t]he threat of 
punishment – let alone an empty threat – has a limited impact on human behavior.”176  
It logically follows that when a culture has become “intoxicated with hatred and 
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violence,”177 the “empty threat” of a THR lawsuit in the U.S. will have a negligible 
impact on the decisions of officials contemplating the perpetration of human rights 
violations.     
2. The World Will Not be Watching 
Unlike the judgments rendered by international criminal tribunals, such as the 
ICTY and ICTR, no U.S.-based litigation addressing a contemporary THR violation 
has ever been the object of worldwide attention among the general public.178  
Consequently, the U.S. courts deciding these cases have failed to garner an 
international consensus as to the legitimacy of their judgments.  Without such a 
consensus, the U.S. courts lack the international endorsement that is needed to 
effectively and authoritatively deter future violations.  Mere disapproval in the U.S. of 
the defendant’s conduct is simply not enough.  The concurrence of the international 
community is needed to effectively deter human rights violations.     
D. Failure to Create a Respectable “Record” 
Beth Stephens has argued that one of the benefits of litigating THR cases in 
U.S. courts is that it creates “an official record of the human rights abuses inflicted on 
[the plaintiffs] or their families.”179  Although the establishment of such a record may 
be gratifying to the plaintiffs involved, it is not likely to have any practical 
significance where the furtherance of global human rights interests is concerned.  As 
discussed in Part One, such “records” tend to depict only one side of the story, and are 
often founded upon unreliable evidence.  Their utility is limited because they fail to 
provide the international community with a full picture of what happened. 
 Moreover, there seems to be an implicit assumption among advocates of such 
litigation that a courtroom trial is the only way for the victim’s story to be 
meaningfully imparted to the outside world.180  Such an assumption is difficult to 
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fathom, given the easy access to abundant media sources existing in American 
society.  The victims of THR abuses can publicize their stories in any number of ways 
without ever setting foot inside a courtroom.  
 Furthermore, when victims rely on non-legal means of publicizing their 
stories, they make it easier to obtain a more thorough, balanced account of what 
happened.  If an accused THR violator is inclined to explain his actions, it is only 
natural that he would prefer to do so in a non-legal setting, away from all of the 
scrutiny, pressure and tension of the courtroom.  It is generally more pleasant to be 
interviewed by a journalist than to be cross-examined by opposing counsel.  
Additionally, the media is likely to have investigative resources that are just as good, 
if not better, than the public interest groups typically representing the plaintiffs in 
these cases. 
 It should also be noted that the initiation of THR litigation in a U.S. court 
could be counter-productive where the objective is to obtain information.  As noted by 
Professors Malcolm Evans and Rod Morgan,  
[T]he problem posed by having ever greater recourse to domestic  
courts, criminal or civil, for claims in relation to torture or other  
forms of ill-treatment is that it could encourage [the] negative  
effect [of] governments battening down the informational hatches.181              
 
In such a scenario, it is clear that THR litigation is not conducive to the furtherance of 
international human rights interests because it restricts the world’s access to 
information rather than expanding it. 
 The creation of an official record, via litigation, only serves to vindicate the 
interests of the individual plaintiffs involved.  It does little to benefit global human 
rights interests.  As demonstrated in the next section, there are other ways in which 
this lack of congruity between the ephemeral, individualized satisfaction of THR 
plaintiffs and the advancement of international human rights is manifested.   
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E. Failure to Advance International Human Rights Interests by Individual 
Satisfaction 
 
This section begins with the premise that “human rights typically deal with 
individuals as part of larger communities.”182  This being the case, tort litigation, 
which focuses squarely “on the purely bilateral relation between victim and 
tortfeasor,”183 is a particularly ineffective tool for advancing THR interests.  Rather 
than pursuing a solution that seeks to remedy and deter transgressions perpetrated 
against an entire community, THR litigation merely provides an avenue towards 
piecemeal “justice” for a few select inhabitants of these communities.  Where the 
effective, lasting promotion and enforcement of international human rights is 
concerned, such a solution is almost entirely inconsequential.  This is best 
demonstrated by the failure of THR litigation in the U.S. to leave any form of legacy 
within the international community during twenty-plus years since Filartiga.184  
 Moreover, the individualized nature of the remedy is not limited to the 
victim’s context. It also extends to the violators.  Reflecting upon the Filartiga 
decision, Stephen Schneebaum writes:  “[t]he point was not that Paraguay violated a 
treaty in the torture of Joelito Filartiga; it was that his torture and murder by Amerigo 
Pena-Irala were nevertheless violations of the law of nations.”185  Although he 
assuredly does it unintentionally, Schneebaum articulates why the focus of THR 
litigation in U.S. courts is so misdirected.  Rather than attempting to effectively 
influence the brutal Stroessner regime in Paraguay to stop oppressing its citizens, the 
Filartiga litigation merely addressed the plight of one family and the conduct of one 
low-level official.   
 THR advocates would likely respond to this criticism by claiming that they 
seek to vindicate the human rights interests of these various communities “one case at 
a time.”  However, this argument falters because few cases are ever brought.  Even 
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viewed in the aggregate, they have certainly failed to have any meaningful impact 
upon the targeted communities.   
Moreover, although it is true that the class-action suit in In re Marcos Human 
Rights Litigation led to a judgment awarding $1.2 billion in punitive damages to 
approximately 10,000 class members,186 this result still constitutes “individualized 
justice” because the nature of the remedy is a separate award for each individual class 
member, rather than a general course of action extending beyond all class members to 
the remainder of the Philippine community.  Community-based problems require 
community-based solutions. 
 THR litigation in U.S. courts is doomed to remain devoid of any lasting legacy 
in the promotion and enforcement of international human rights because it proposes 
individualized solutions for community-oriented problems.  This is yet another reason 
why other members of the international community have not seriously contemplated 
the results of such litigation when formulating or implementing human rights policies.  
As shown in the next section however, there are still more reasons for this 
shortcoming. 
F. Failure to Issue Decisions that Other States Will Take Seriously  
1. Undermining the Gravity of the Offense 
Initiating a private tort claim against someone varies drastically from 
prosecuting that person for the commission of an international crime.  Although it is 
true that the same specific conduct may be the focal point of each type of action, the 
respective contexts in which the facts surrounding this conduct are brought to light 
differ dramatically.  The context in which private tort claims are raised in the U.S. 
lacks the solemnity of a criminal prosecution, regardless of whether such a 
prosecution is before an American or international tribunal.  When a torture case is 
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addressed in the same context as a dog-bite case, the opprobrium of the international 
crime is severely undermined.  As Lyal Sunga remarks:   
[T]he use of a statute designed for tort claims, but applied to  
torture, appears to belittle the status of torture as an  
international crime; in national law, mere ‘wrongs’ actionable  
though they are, are generally considered less grave than ‘crimes.’187         
Consequently, foreign decision-makers will not contemplate a U.S. court’s decision in 
a private tort case with the same degree of seriousness that they would a criminal 
court’s decision.           
2. Parochialism and Patriotism 
Regrettably, as Professor Chibundu has observed:  “[t]he tendency of judicial 
opinions to read more like press releases by the plaintiff (rather than an impartial 
evaluation of the facts) is an all-too-familiar feature of the [THR] decisions.”188  As 
an example, Chibundu cites an excerpt from the court’s opinion in Alejandre v. Cuba, 
in which it states:  “[t]he government of Cuba, on February 24, 1996, in outrageous 
contempt for international law and basic human rights, murdered four human beings 
in international airspace over the Florida Straits.”189  This begs the question of 
whether the authors of such opinions are able to cast aside parochial biases when 
evaluating the legal issues raised in such cases.190  As another example, Chibundu 
refers us to the case of Flatlow v. Iran, examined in Part One, where the overzealous 
judge awarded $100 million more in damages against the Iranian government than the 
plaintiffs had even requested.191  When U.S. courts strive for the polemic rather than 
the pragmatic, the international community is less inclined to hold their decisions in 
serious regard when addressing human rights issues. 
3. The United States’ Human Rights Record 
As established in this section, the United States hardly qualifies as a champion 
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of human rights.  Because its human rights record is far from exemplary, the 
international community will not be inclined to regard the opinions of American 
courts on human rights issues with much reverence.  This demonstrates yet another 
failure of THR litigation in U.S. courts to have an effective and lasting impact on 
global human rights matters. 
a. Non-membership in human rights treaties 
The U.S. “lags far behind the rest of the developed world (and a sizable 
portion of the under-developed world) in signing, ratifying and implementing major 
human rights initiatives.”192  The U.S. still has not ratified treaties addressing 
economic, social and cultural rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, and even the 
laws of war.193  Moreover, even when the U.S. does ratify a human rights treaty, such 
as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, it always declares it “non-self-executing.”194  This is a dualist 
approach, requiring ancillary legislation before a private right of action can exist in 
accordance with the treaty.195  Furthermore, whenever the Senate consents to the 
ratification of a human rights treaty, it always conditions its consent upon the 
attachment of reservations to the treaties’ provisions.196  These reservations serve to 
nullify the domestic force of these treaties within the U.S.197  The result is that “the 
U.S. government uses the international human rights system to measure the 
legitimacy of foreign governmental acts, but it systematically declines to hold 
domestic acts to the same legal scrutiny.”198   
 Under these conditions, it is absurd for U.S. courts to act as standard-setters 
for the rest of the world in the arena of human rights.  The U.S.’s failure to 
meaningfully participate in so many of the world’s major human rights conventions is 
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abject.  It severely undermines its courts’ credibility as arbiters of the very rights 
promoted in these agreements. 
b. Hypocrisy regarding the treatment of defendants 
As we have just seen, although THR litigation in the U.S. allows American 
courts to scrutinize other nations’ compliance with international human rights 
standards, the U.S. government has been unwilling to apply such standards against its 
own citizens.199  A key example is the U.S.’s refusal to ratify the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court.  A primary reason for this refusal is concern that U.S. 
troops and other government officials might be subject to the court’s jurisdiction.200  
For similar reasons, the U.S. has refused to sign the Land Mine Treaty.201  
 A stark conflict of interest exists between the U.S.’s internal and external 
human rights policies.  As Stephen Schneebaum writes:  “[t]he United States is the 
great champion of international law in the world, so long as it is winning, but the 
moment it stands to have its conduct condemned, it changes the rules.”202  Under 
these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine the rest of the world seriously 
contemplating any human rights-related decision emanating from a U.S. court. 
c. Vindication or violation? 
In deciding THR cases, U.S. courts stand poised to violate the defendants’ 
human rights, and possibly those of their fellow citizens.  This is an interesting 
paradox, as the purported vindication of one set of human rights might require the 
violation of others.  As demonstrated, at least four fundamental human rights are 
subject to violation during the course of a THR case’s proceedings in a U.S. court.               
(1) Right to self-determination 
In Part One, I argue that when THR litigation in the U.S. presumes to remove 
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an elected official from the performance of his duties, even temporarily, it violates his 
constituents’ right of self-determination.  Such officials are elected by their 
constituents to assist them in the free pursuit of economic, social and cultural 
development.  These are all components of the right of self-determination embodied 
in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (“ICESR”), 
and Article 21(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which 
recognizes everyone’s  “right to take part in the government of his country, . . . 
through freely chosen representatives.”   
Let us assume that a freely chosen representative, facing the threat of an 
exorbitant money judgment against him, is forced to defend his actions (or inactions) 
through a protracted litigation process in the U.S.  In such a situation, his ability to 
participate in the government of his country will be stifled, along with that of his 
constituents, albeit vicariously.  In such a situation, litigation purporting to vindicate a 
human rights violation, results in a violation of the right to self-determination. 
(2) Right to a fair civil hearing 
Article 14(1) of the ICCPR states that “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the 
courts and Tribunals” and that “[i]n the determination . . . of his rights and obligations 
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”  When the U.S. ratified the 
ICCPR, it did not include any reservation to the portion of Article 14 addressing civil 
trials.203  Part One demonstrates that the proceedings of THR cases in U.S. courts, 
from start to finish, are not fair.  Furthermore, both Parts show that the competence, 
independence and impartiality of these courts are also suspect.  Because almost all 
THR litigation in U.S. courts involves default judgments that are rife with inequities, 
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such proceedings will likely involve infractions of the defendants’ right to a fair 
hearing.      
(3) Right to equal protection and freedom from  
discrimination based upon national origin 
 
 As briefly noted in Part One, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the statute governing the 
venue of civil cases in federal courts, discriminates between American and alien 
defendants.  Although American defendants can only be sued in districts that are 
connected with the case (such as the district where the defendant resides, or where the 
subject events occurred), the statute allows plaintiffs to sue aliens in any district.204  
Consequently, plaintiffs filing THR lawsuits can sue in the most favorable fora 
possible solely because the defendants are not U.S. citizens.    
Article 26 of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the UDHR both state that all are 
“equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law.”  Moreover the ICCPR’s language contains an express 
prohibition against discrimination based upon national origin.205  Thus, the 
defendant’s right to equal protection and freedom from nationality-based 
discrimination stands to be violated every time a THR plaintiff forum shops.   
(4) Right to not be arbitrarily deprived of property 
 
  Article 17(2) of the UDHR states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property.”  If the plaintiff in a THR lawsuit ever succeeds in collecting damages 
from the defendant, the collection will probably constitute a violation of this 
provision.  As discussed in Part One, the default judgments awarding damages in 
these cases are very arbitrary, as they are rendered in the defendant’s absence, and 
based solely upon the plaintiffs’ evidence.  It would be equally arbitrary to permit a 
plaintiff to seize a defendant’s property under such circumstances.   
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4. Nothing Has Happened 
For over twenty years, U.S. courts have been issuing judgments in THR cases, 
with little or no consequence in the field of international human rights.  Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that the rest of the world ignores these decisions.  This is 
particularly so as international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR and ICC 
continue to play more significant roles in the promotion and enforcement of 
international human rights.     
5. Brief Summary 
     In summary, one reason why THR litigation in U.S. courts fails to 
effectively promote and enforce human rights is because the international community 
does not take the courts’ decisions seriously.  Several factors contribute to this failure.  
The proceedings are abysmally unfair to the defendants.  Civil in nature, they fail to 
cast a proper air of gravity upon the violations at issue.  The decisions emanating from 
these proceedings are sometimes products of parochial zeal, rather than an objective 
evaluation of the facts and application of the law.  They are a product of the judicial 
system of a nation with a human rights record that is mediocre at best.  Finally, these 
decisions have never generated any meaningful results in the arena of international 
human rights.   
F. Failure to Appreciate the Parochial Nature of Human Rights 
Human rights are parochial phenomena.  A given human right does not consist 
of one uniform and ubiquitous concept, but rather a variety of notions that are “likely 
to be influenced by local considerations.”206  The dimensions of a human right within 
a particular community “are inevitably the product of that particular community’s 
historically-situated understandings.”207  As demonstrated in this section, one of the 
reasons why THR litigation in U.S. courts has failed to effectively promote and 
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enforce international human rights is because the American way of adjudicating 
human rights claims fails to devote any consideration to the differing notions of 
human rights pervading other communities.  Such litigation is founded upon the 
erroneous premise that the communities “targeted” by the decisions of U.S. courts 
will willingly embrace wholly American notions of human rights.  Three key reasons 
explain why litigation based upon this premise cannot lead to meaningful results.     
  1. Definitional Problems 
 No definitional consensus exists regarding the precise contents of most human 
rights.208  Moreover, even if we assume that such a consensus does exist regarding a 
right’s definition, such a definition will inevitably be the subject of varying 
interpretations, based upon the differing perspectives that exist from one community 
to the next.  Therefore, when a U.S. court purports to delineate the dimensions of a 
human right in a given case, its definition is likely to conflict with those of other 
communities. 
 Advocates of THR litigation in U.S. courts are likely to argue that in a case 
such as Filartiga, the defendant clearly perpetrated acts constituting torture by any 
community’s definition of the word.  I do not disagree with this assertion.  The 
ninety-minute, tape-recorded interrogation and electrocution of young Joelito Filartiga 
at the hands of the Asuncion police in reprisal for his father’s opposition to the 
Stroessner regime209 was unquestionably an insidious act of torture by any 
community’s definition.  The problem is that in less severe cases, the varying 
definitions of torture from one community to the next make it impossible for a 
universal line to be drawn between acts that constitute torture and acts that do not.       
     The supporters of THR litigation will likely retort that U.S. courts should at 
least adjudicate the “most severe cases.”  But how does a court determine whether a 
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case is severe enough?  The problem with U.S. courts deciding severe torture cases 
such as Filartiga is that it paves the way for the 600-plus federal judges to claim that 
“they know severe torture when they see it.”  Such a practice inevitably creates a 
“slippery slope” leading to internationally controversial definitions of human rights 
norms.  
   a. But somebody has to draw the line 
 Advocates of THR litigation will also argue that somebody has to address 
these cases if human rights law is ever to have any real significance.  I agree 
wholeheartedly.  However, it is my assertion that the proper “somebody” is certainly 
not a U.S. federal district judge.  I submit that the proper “somebody” must either (1) 
have a keen understanding of the “target locality’s” concept of a given human right  
(for example Paraguay’s concepts of torture and extrajudicial killing in the Filartiga 
case) or (2) have been appointed through the sovereign mandate of the target locality 
to determine the concept’s meaning (for example Germany’s accession to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights).  Without such an arbiter, 
judgments purporting to define the scopes of human rights are doomed to be 
dismissed as ignorant of local concepts and interventionist.  The result is inefficacy in 
the target locality.  For this reason, when effective and lasting change is the goal, U.S. 
judges and juries will seldom ever qualify as the proper authorities for determining 
the scopes of human rights in other localities.    
  2. The Specter of Naturalism 
 When we juxtapose the parochial nature of human rights with its naturalist and 
value-oriented foundations, the arguments against THR litigation in U.S. courts are 
bolstered even further.  Professor Alfred P. Rubin states that: 
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  [S]tates being equal as sovereigns, any perception of natural 
  law held in any state must reflect only that state’s officials’  
  views of the needs of the international order and a value-laden 
  moral system.  It is simply impossible within a municipal system 
  by which judges are educated and promoted on the basis of 
  parochial decisions, and whose court system is part of the national 
  constitution of a single legal order, for national judges to be  
  objectively seen as applying any “universal,” “eternal” law.210   
As a result, when U.S. courts decide THR cases, they articulate human rights 
standards based upon American moral ideals and values that do not complement those 
of the target localities.  Such naturalistic decisions are likely to be rejected in these 
other communities, failing to foster any meaningful human rights reforms.  Moreover, 
as Professor Rubin indicates, the naturalism inherent in these judgments serves to set 
the world asunder rather than uniting it: 
  The natural law argument used to pierce national boundaries 
  turns out to cut the other way and reinforce the legal boundaries 
  that determine municipal legal orders, each reflecting the value  
  system the state has chosen through its history and political  
  processes as the best reflection of the natural law as it ought to 
  apply to matters essentially within its own borders.211         
As demonstrated in the next section however, the divisiveness of naturalism is not the 
only reason why THR litigation in U.S. courts can do more harm than good in 
promoting and enforcing international human rights.  The problem is further 
compounded by interventionism. 
3. The Perils of Interventionism 
In order to truly capture the brashness of the interventionist spirit that is so 
commonplace among advocates of THR litigation in U.S. courts, it is helpful to 
examine the words of these advocates themselves.  Beth Stephens, perhaps the most 
outspoken advocate of this litigation among academics and practitioners, has written:  
“[T]he precedents in [the U.S.] must be used to facilitate the development of a civil 
remedy [for human rights violations] in other nations.”212  She also writes that 
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“[h]uman rights litigation is just one example of an area in which the United States 
can be proud to lead the way.”213  Labeling the ATS a “human rights beacon,” 
Michael Small states that:  “[b]y granting jurisdiction under the [ATS], federal courts 
can foster global legal order and enforce international human rights norms.”214  He 
also claims, in rather naturalist fashion, that:  “[b]y exercising jurisdiction over 
international human rights claims,  federal courts put the United States on high moral 
ground.”215  Professor Kathryn Boyd, in her article supporting the abandonment of 
forum non conveniens dismissals in THR cases, asserts that:  “the United States has a 
strong interest in influencing the evolutionary process by which international norms 
emerge and are applied.”216  Finally, Gregory Wallance, an international lawyer in 
New York, avers that: “[t]he cold war paradigm was the United States as global 
policeman.  The post-cold-war paradigm is the United States as global attorney.”217   
 Criticizing such claims, Professor Chibundu observes: 
  Such pat statements, however, only barely mask the issues of  
  power and chauvinism they entail.  The obfuscation of these 
  concerns by pulling on the heartstrings of universal humanity 
  can at most be temporary, for at heart, it undercuts the  
  normative justification of the “rule of law,” which is one of 
  the frequently invoked pillars of the new order in international 
  relations.218  
Even a cursory reading of the myriad of law journal articles lauding the “merits” of 
THR litigation in U.S. courts will convince the reader that an understanding exists, 
among supporters of this litigation, that the U.S. can and should dictate the human 
rights policies of other nations through its courts’ decisions.  Such a philosophy 
warrants severe criticism, as its practical implementation is ultimately baneful to the 
interests of the effective promotion and enforcement of international human rights. 
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   a. A catalyst for resistance to human rights reform   
 Much of the world harbors a deep resentment towards the intervention of other 
nations, such as the U.S., in their internal affairs.  Consequently, it should be no 
surprise that when a country such as the U.S. professes to dictate the human rights 
norms that other countries must observe, many nations will respond by either refusing 
to cooperate with transnational investigations and adjudications, or refusing to adopt 
the norms promoted through such judgments.219  They view such acts and omissions 
as defenses against encroachments upon their sovereign authority.220  Professor Curtis 
Bradley notes that:   
[THR judgments rendered by U.S. courts]  may simply be  
dismissed by the affected societies on the ground that they do  
not reflect a full understanding of the local history, culture, and  
conditions, and perhaps also on the ground that they are an example  
of US overreaching.221 
  
Moreover, developing nations are not the only ones that deplore such extensive 
exercises of jurisdiction.  European countries have also asserted that “the United 
States has no right to assert jurisdiction over persons who are neither present nor 
acting within the U.S. territory.”222    
 Judgments stemming from THR litigation in U.S. courts fail to establish 
human rights norms that other nations will incorporate into their own systems.  The 
repugnance of the interventionism embedded within this approach repels states from 
internalizing suggested reforms.  Whether such resistance occurs solely as a matter of 
sovereign pride is immaterial.  The point is that the approach taken by the U.S. courts 
not only fails to work, but threatens to be counter-productive.    
b. Precluding states from developing their own human 
rights norms 
 
  Without question, “the most effective deterrent to continued human rights 
abuses” is the development and application of “meaningful domestic remedies.”223  
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Because concepts of human rights vary from one political community to the next, 
these respective communities are the most appropriate legislators of the remedies 
needed to promote and enforce these rights.224  However, when a U.S. court decides a 
case addressing human rights issues in another country, it “sit[s] in judgment, not just 
on [that country’s] everyday activities, but on the activities at the heart of [its] 
political community.”225  In so doing, the American court may effectively remove 
awareness of the THR violations from the societies most affected by them.226  This 
may lead to a deterioration of the local judiciaries, an ignorance of individual rights in 
the local community, and a preference for “the extrajudicial mauling of opponents” 
rather than the “judicial fashioning and enforcement” of human rights.227  Moreover, 
it may lead to a removal of pressure on the government of a target locality to hold 
itself accountable before its own domestic legal tribunal.228         
    (1) A “hands off” judicial policy 
THR litigation in U.S. courts threatens to stymie the target locality’s 
internalization of human rights norms and responsibilities- a process that stems from 
local resolutions, whether they emerge in the form of “a local adjudication, truth 
commission, or even an agreed-upon amnesty.”229  Thus, it threatens to undermine the 
most effective method of deterring future human rights abuses.  By compelling its 
civil courts to observe a “hands off” policy, requiring abstention from the adjudication 
of THR cases, the U.S. can make it easier for the target localities to develop their own 
procedural and substantive human rights laws.230  In the long run, this is a far more 
effective way for American courts to promote and enforce human rights abroad.  
Sometimes the best action is inaction.       
 Advocates of THR litigation in U.S. courts will be quick to argue that this 
approach would be ineffective, as the unavailability of a local remedy is the very 
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reason why THR abuse victims are suing in the U.S.  However, I submit that the U.S. 
can play a far more effective role in the effective promotion and enforcement of 
international human rights by acting in concert with the international community to 
persuade target localities to undertake internal judicial and legislative reforms.  Of 
course, the precise nature of this cooperation and the requisite efforts to persuade 
remain subject to debate, and will surely vary from one target locality to the next.  
However, the key point is that a target locality is more likely to respond to an 
international stimulus than a provincial one.  When such persuasion succeeds, the 
target locality becomes better equipped to internalize and enforce its own human 
rights norms.  In the end, the benefits (the more effective deterrence of human rights 
abuses) of a judicial “hands off” policy would dramatically outweigh the costs (the 
elimination of unfair and inconsequential judicial decisions).   
 Naturally, the “international alternative” is not a panacea for the countless 
human rights crises afflicting the world today.  Indeed, the use of international 
persuasion to promote human rights reforms may often be slow and unreliable, or 
possibly dismissed as another brand of interventionism.  However, even if this 
approach only succeeds in nudging a few target localities towards the adoption of 
human rights reforms, it already will have accomplished far more than ineffective and 
counter-productive THR litigation in U.S. courts.    
III. Conclusions 
 The litigation of THR cases in U.S. courts fails to effectively promote and 
enforce human rights abroad.  No meaningful, lasting solution to either the case at 
hand or the general human rights dilemma from which it emerged has ever been 
achieved.  During the past two decades, American courts deciding these cases have 
awarded millions of dollars to the plaintiffs, who have collected a grand total of $400.  
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The enforcement of such judgments is virtually impossible.  Defendants can easily 
flee the U.S. with their assets.  The process for collecting such assets is costly.  
Foreign courts must inevitably enforce such judgments on an ad hoc basis, as the U.S. 
is not party to a single enforcement convention.  Sometimes these courts will refuse to 
enforce such judgments.  In most cases, the entire endeavor is fruitless ab initio, as the 
defendants are generally low-level officials who could not afford to pay even a tiny 
fraction of the judgment anyway.  
 THR lawsuits filed in U.S. courts are trivial pursuits because they fail, in every 
conceivable way, to advance international human rights interests.  They do not 
effectively discourage human rights violators from coming to the U.S.  They do not 
deter future THR violations.  They do not establish respectable records of the 
violations committed.  Limiting their focus to individualized vindications, they fail to 
provide collectively beneficial solutions to THR problems.  They fail to draw serious 
attention from the foreign decision-makers who formulate and implement human 
rights policies.  With no apology for interventionism, U.S. courts presume to impose 
their own norms upon target localities with differing values, often depriving them of 
opportunities to develop and enforce their human rights laws domestically.  
 If the U.S. truly desires to make a lasting contribution to the promotion and 
enforcement of international human rights, it will adopt a “hands off” policy 
prohibiting its courts from interfering in THR matters.  Its focus should be redirected 
towards international efforts to persuade target localities to undertake meaningful 
human rights reforms on their own accord.  Rather than being a “maverick” 
promoting provincial notions of justice, the U.S. should become more of a “team 
player” in international efforts to further human rights interests. 
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CONCLUSION:  AN ODYSSEY TO NOWHERE 
I. THR Litigation:  A Product of American Idealism 
 When Judge Kaufman issued his decision in Filartiga, almost twenty-two 
years ago, he did so with the most honorable intentions.  Surely most of us have long 
desired to realize the “ageless dream” of a world in which all are free from “brutal 
violence” or other gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
Moreover, to the extent that they seek to fulfill this dream indiscriminately, I do not 
question the intentions of today’s human rights advocates.  The problem lies in the 
uniquely American method advocated for achieving this dream, a method that is 
excessively idealistic. 
 THR litigation in U.S. courts is hopelessly unfair and ineffective.  In asserting 
that it is “hopelessly” so, I submit that no matter how U.S. lawmakers might endeavor 
to re-craft the language of the procedural and substantive laws directly affecting this 
unique type of litigation, severe flaws will remain, inevitably undermining the 
objective of effectively promoting and enforcing human rights abroad.  This is 
because these flaws do not lie in the language of the laws, but in the premises behind 
them when applied in the THR context.  Each premise reflects the idealistic notion 
that what works in the U.S. will also work internationally in the human rights arena.   
One such premise is that American-style litigation is conducive to the fair resolution 
of THR dilemmas.  The errors of this premise are discussed exhaustively in Part One 
and require no further elaboration.   However, four other provincialist premises exist, 
warranting at least cursory attention. 
 A. Civil Lawsuits Deter Wrongful Conduct  
 In contemporary American society, the prospect of being sued is an effective 
form of behavior control.  I recall many past clients, aspiring to start new businesses, 
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discussing how they were eager to get started but could not do anything until 
incorporating or taking other measures to limit their liability- just in case they might 
get sued.  Such concern is enhanced by the possibility of a lawsuit for punitive 
damages.  Moreover, when a defendant is sued for conduct that is not covered by 
insurance, the risk of financial ruin is genuine.  Therefore, in the U.S., the imminence 
of a person’s economic demise for wrongful conduct provides a strong motivation for 
good behavior.     
   This is not so in the THR context.  A non-U.S. citizen committing torture 
abroad does not sense any threat of financial devastation.  As demonstrated supra, this 
is the least of his considerations.  Unlike in the American context, the deterrent effect 
of a civil judgment is negligible. 
 B. Cases, Not Contexts 
 The Anglo-American case precedent system governs an American judge’s 
analysis of what the law is, and how it should be applied to the facts.  When the judge 
decides a case, she first reviews the facts and the legal issues presented.  She then 
finds the applicable rule of law by looking to prior cases involving similar facts and 
legal issues.  Although each case arises from different events, a common bond still 
exists.  This bond is that they all emanate from the same socio-cultural context- 
American society. 
 When U.S. courts adjudicate THR cases, the contextual bond vanishes.  The 
case precedent system does not afford judges the opportunity to tailor their decisions 
based upon the particular norms of the target localities.  They must apply the law as 
articulated in prior cases lacking a common contextual bond with the case at bar.  The 
system was not designed to regulate parochial phenomena such as international 
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human rights, which vary from community to community.  Therefore, ineffective 
solutions to the problems of target localities are inevitable.   
 C. The Effectiveness of Tort Remedies 
American tort remedies are based upon an individualized theory of justice.  
They are designed to make an individual plaintiff “whole again” (to the extent that 
this is possible), and to deter an individual’s wrongful conduct.  They are not designed 
to repair or deter injustices perpetrated by governments and afflicting entire political 
communities, nor can they effectively do so.  Indeed, even at the individual level, the 
THR lawsuits filed in U.S. courts provide precious little justice, as the plaintiff is not 
made “whole again”, and the defendant almost always escapes unpunished.  Thus, at 
both the community and individual levels, the litigation yields no meaningful results.  
Some injustices cannot simply be “sued away.”  
D. “Universal” Norms 
Advocates of THR litigation are likely to argue that it is proper for U.S. courts 
to articulate human rights norms because they are universal in nature, transcending all 
boundaries.  However, human rights are only universal in nature to the extent that 
some common ground exists regarding the contents of their definitions from one 
community to the next.  The question thus becomes one of who should define this 
common ground.  I submit that this role should not be delegated to American judges 
and juries, as they are ill-qualified to determine the precise contents of the norms 
observed by the rest of the world.   
E. Conclusion 
Expanding upon the contents of Parts One and Two, each of the four premises 
briefly discussed above further elucidates the faultiness of the presumption that U.S. 
courts can fairly and effectively adjudicate THR cases.  These faults are unavoidable, 
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regardless of any measures that U.S. lawmakers might take in an effort to improve 
their international efficacy.  If the U.S. truly desires to play a significant role in the 
effective promotion and advancement of human rights abroad, it must shift its 
attention away from the rigidly American solution of piecemeal litigation, focusing 
instead on international solutions.  Until then, Judge Kaufman’s benevolent odyssey 
to advance human rights will continue to lead nowhere.                 
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